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Abstract
We study an all-pay contest with multiple identical prizes ("lifeboat seats").
Prizes are partitioned into subsets of prizes ("lifeboats"). Players play a twostage game. First, each player chooses an element of the partition ("a lifeboat").
Then each player competes for a prize in the subset chosen ("a seat"). We
characterize and compare the subgame perfect equilibria in which all players
employ pure strategies or all players play identical mixed strategies in the first
stage. We find that the partitioning of prizes allows for coordination failure
among players when they play nondegenerate mixed strategies and this can
shelter rents and reduce rent dissipation compared to some of the less eﬃcient
pure strategy equilibria.
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Introduction

When a ship sinks, passengers must hurry to find a lifeboat and, if the boat is crowded,
there might be some competition over seats.1 Still, even though there were more
passengers than lifeboat seats on the Titanic, there were both lifeboats launched at
less than full capacity and boats for which there was intense competition for seats.
Indeed, ships sometimes sink much faster than the Titanic,2 making the problem of
the allocation of lifeboat seats an even more diﬃcult, and sometimes less peaceful
task.
The battle over seats in diﬀerent lifeboats can be seen as a metaphor for a whole
class of situations in which the players in a group partition themselves into smaller
subgroups, and the members of each subgroup compete for one of several prizes that
are awarded to some of the members of the respective subgroup. Competition may
be intense in a subgroup if there are more contestants than prizes in this group,
and competition is absent if prizes are abundant. Using the lifeboat metaphor, we
call this game of endogenous self-partitioning followed by competition the lifeboat
problem. We show in a symmetric version of this game that multiple subgame perfect
equilibria exist and an equilibrium partitioning of players may be realized through
both symmetric mixed strategies and asymmetric pure strategies. When there are
more players than prizes in the aggregate, these endogenous choices can shelter rents
that would be dissipated in a single large contest. The equilibrium payoﬀ in a subgame
perfect equilibrium with symmetric mixed strategies played in the first stage (as
regards each player’s choice of the set of prizes) can yield higher or lower rents than
those arising in some of the equilibria employing pure strategies.
1

The shortage of lifeboat seats has been frequently discussed in the most famous ship catastrophe,

the sinking of the Titanic. In their empirical analysis Frey, Savage and Torgler (2009) analyze the
determinants of who among the 2207 passengers of the Titanic survived. The sinking of the Titanic
took several hours, and the process of evacuating the ship is reported as having been mostly civilized
and fairly coordinated. See, for instance, the Report of the British Wreck Commissioner’s Inquiry
(1912) which can be both found at http://www.titanicinquiry.org/.
2
Frey et al.(2009) note the case of the HMS Birkenhead which sank in 25 minutes in 1852. The
American tranport ship The Antilles was struck by a torpedo in 1917 and sank in five minutes. 167
of the 237 persons on board were rescued. The cruiseferry MS Estonia sank in 1994 in a fifty-five
minute period. Of the 938 passengers, it is estimated that up to 310 reached the outer deck and 160
managed to climb into liferafts or lifeboats. 138 passengers were rescued.
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The lifeboat problem appears in a number of situations in which humans or
other organisms must self-partition in a decentralized manner to engage in dissipative
contests for prizes or other games in which competition dissipates rents among the
competitors.
One important example is educational or professional choice in a world with
specialization and complementary skills where scarcity premia accrue to players who
choose a specialization which then turns out to be in excess demand. The empirical
literature on education shows that both the enrollment rate in higher education3 and
the choices of particular fields exhibit considerable fluctuations over time,4 rather than
following a smooth pattern. The literature that addresses this problem has focused
on the dynamics resulting from individuals who form their expectations on the basis
of current labor market conditions or try to form rational expectations. One of the
first approaches is Freeman (1975a,b). He suggested that students may follow a strategy that bases their decisions on observed wages, and concluded that this may cause
patterns that look like cobb-web cycles. Siow (1984) and Orazem and Mattila (1991)
also consider a dynamic approach, employing a rational expectations assumption.
Borghans, de Grip and Heijke (1996) document the considerable mismatch between
education choices and the labor market and attribute this to students’ expecations
that rest on current labor market conditions. This literature documents a considerable amount of mismatching and variation over time and suggests that mismatching is
a loss. It does not focus on the problem of strategic interaction and the coordination
problem these simultaneous and independent choices involve. The "lifeboat problem"
that is analysed in this paper does not consider the dynamics of the matching problem of education and labor markets, but sheds light on the interdependence of the
individuals’ simultaneous decision problems and its potential for coordination failure
(i.e., mixed strategy equilibria). It suggests that this coordination failure of student
cohorts need not only have a detrimental eﬀect, but may also shield some of their
rents which would otherwise dissipate in the competition.
Examples exhibiting similar patterns appear in many other contexts. Professional tennis players need to choose among a set of simultaneous or overlapping
tournaments, not knowing the choices of competitors with whom they would like to
3
4

For a short survey of some of this evidence see Neugart and Tuinstra (2003).
See, for instance, Eckstein, Weiss and Fleising (1988, p. 397) for electrical engeneering.
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avoid competing. Contests among animals provide further examples. Single animals
need to make a choice of nesting areas, where animals choose individually among
distinct territories and overpopulation of a territory leads to a war of attrition.5 Finally, the problem is related to enty games among firms if firms can choose between
diﬀerent business areas or product types, and if a choice of the same product type or
business area generates fierce competition.6
For simplicity, we assume that players are identical from an ex ante standpoint,
wish to obtain at most one prize, and that the contests are perfectly dissipative under
homogeneity, as arises in a multiple prize all-pay auction or a multiple-unit pay-asbid winner-pay auction with complete information. In these types of contests, if the
number of identical prizes in a contest is greater than or equal to the number of
competitors who compete for the prizes, everyone receives a prize with zero expenditure, but if the number of competitors is strictly greater than the number of prizes,
dissipation is complete and the competitors receive no benefit in expectation. This
notion of competition captures the idea that within a given environment in which the
agents are competing, if competition is suﬃciently "cut-throat" agents on the long
side of the market gain nothing in expectation while those on the short side of the
market collectively obtain all potential gains from trade.7 In this context, the "fail5

A critical aspect of these examples is that self-partition takes place across a set of contests

and prizes that are fixed. That is, the matching problem faced is one-sided and not two-sided.
Sometimes this is natural due to time-to-build on one side of the market. Lifeboats must be loaded
on the ship before it sails. Specialized education programs or professions typically take many years
to evolve. Wildlife habitats may take considerably longer to be developed. In other environments
it may be more unclear whether one side of the market has a quasi-fixed nature. For instance, the
choice of market platforms by buyers and sellers may involve two-sided self-partition. However if,
for example, the sellers’ side of the market involves large players who themselves establish platforms
with which to interact with many small buyers, this may be viewed as a one-sided buyer problem
with precommitted sellers.
6
Models of entry games with a simple decision whether to enter a single market or stay out
include Levin and Smith (1994), Elberfeld and Wolfstetter (1999), Vettas (2000), Cabral (2004)
and Lu (2010). As pointed out by one reviewer, the "lifeboat" problem departs from much of this
literature with endogenous entry, because in a "lifeboat" problem there are multiple parallel contests
and no entry costs.
7
This property arises not only in the Nash equilibria of many types of non-cooperative bidding
games with identical players and complete information, but also in the core of certain cooperative
coalitional games.

4

ure" to not fill all groups evenly turns out to be a huge benefit if there is an excess
supply of players in the aggregate. In a grand contest with all players competing
for all prizes, the payoﬀs are zero if there are more players than prizes. If the set
of all prizes is partitioned into several sets of prizes, players who select into groups
where there are at least as many prizes as players reap rents. Such rent generating
partitioning arises both in pure strategy equilibria at the stage at which each player
chooses a set of prizes, in which players coordinate in a self-enforcing fashion to not
"spoil the pot" for a subset of rent earners, and in mixed strategy equilibria, in which
"coordination failure" due to randomization in their choices yields stochastic rents
that are symmetric in expectation across players.
Our analysis is related to a number of contest studies in the literature. A
prominent paper in this line of research is the study of contest architecture by
Moldovanu and Sela (2006). They study all-pay auctions with incomplete information
and find that a grand contest for one big prize elicits more aggregate eﬀort in expectation than either the same contest with the prize divided into many smaller prizes
or a partition of the contest into multiple parallel contests in which both the set of
players and the prize are equally divided. Moldovanu and Sela (2006) do not examine
the self-partitioning of players into contests. Fu and Lu (2009) compare a situation
in which all players compete with all other players ("the grand contest") with games
in which the players are partitioned into subgroups. However, the formation of the
subgroups is not part of the game. Piccione and Rubinstein (2007) consider a general
equilibrium model of "equilibrium in the jungle" in which allocation is determined
by a strength relation between pairs of players that is a complete ordering of the
players. A special case of this model may be interpreted as the peaceful allocation
of  prizes among  players (with   ), but with heterogeneity of prizes and sequential allocation based on strength. Perhaps closest to our paper is Amegashie and
Wu (2004), which examines a problem in which  players of strictly ranked abilities
each choose between two contests with  and  prizes respectively, where there are
at least two more players than prizes. Each of the  prizes in one contest are ranked
identically and more highly by the players than each of the  identically ranked prizes
in the second contest. Like in our framework, Amegashie examines a two stage game
in which players simultaneously choose between contests and then play an all-pay
auction with complete information within each contest. Amegashie provides a partial
5

characterization of the set of subgame perfect equilibria with pure local strategies at
the first stage of the game. He does not examine equilibria with mixed local strategies
at the first stage. Moreover, he does not examine the question of how endogenous
choice between diﬀerent sets of prizes through pure or mixed strategies shelters rents,
and how this outcome depends on the structure of the partition of the total number
of prizes.

2

Group choice and the intra-group all-pay contest

We consider the following two-stage game. The set of (ex-ante symmetric) players is
 ≡ {1 2  }. In stage 1 each player chooses one element  of the set  ≡ {1  }.
As one of the interpretations of the game is that the players are passengers on the

Titanic who choose to go to one of the lifeboats, we can describe this choice as each
player  chooses one lifeboat. Players’ choices lead to a quasi-partition of players into
 subsets 1    , with  ≥ 0 the number of players who have chosen the same life

boat , for all  ∈ .8 This completes stage 1. At stage 2 the players in each of the

subsets  compete with each other in an all-pay auction with complete information
and without noise. The rules of the game in this all-pay auction are as follows. Each
 ∈  consists of  identical prizes which are valued equally by all players  ∈  , and

this value is normalized to 1. Each player  ∈  can win at most one prize. If the
player wins no prize, this amounts to a prize value of zero. We may think of  seats

in a life boat, where all players who receive a seat survive with certainty, whereas the
players without a seat fare worse. The allocation of the  prizes among the  players
follows the rules of an all-pay contest as in Barut and Kovenock (1998) among 
symmetric players for    identical prizes of size 1.9 Each contestant chooses an
8

A quasi-partition of the set  is a collection of sets {1   } such that  ∩  = ∅ if  6= 

and ∪=1  =  (see, for instance, Dunn and Hardegree 2001, p. 189). Note that a quasi-partition

diﬀers from a partition in that the sets  need not be nonempty, that is, some lifeboats may go
unused. In the continuation we will sometimes refer to (1   ) as a partition, even though the
collection formally constitutes a quasi-partition.
9
Clark and Riis(1998) examine the case of  players competing to win one of  prizes each of
which players view as identical but for which players’ values strictly diﬀer. Clark and Riis note
that when players value prizes identically multiple equilibria may arise. Barut and Kovenock (1998)
examine the case where for any given prize, the players’ values are identical, but this value may
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eﬀort  , and has a cost of eﬀort ( ), where (·) is continuous and strictly increasing
on [0 ∞) with (0) = 0 and ()  1 for all   ̄, for some 0  ̄  ∞.10

The subgame equilibrium payoﬀs of players in the group  can be extracted

from Barut and Kovenock (1998), using their Theorem 2, setting the highest  prizes
equal to one and all lower prizes equal to zero in their Theorem 2. Their result is
stated as
Lemma 1 (Barut and Kovenock 1998): The payoﬀ of a player  in group 
is equal to zero if    and equal to 1 if  ≤ .
The payoﬀ for  ≤  is immediately intuitive. For instance, if players  = 1  

approach seats 1   , respectively, they face no competition, and this outcome is
perfectly peaceful. If   , full dissipation occurs. This is less obvious but shown
in Barut and Kovenock (1998).11 Roughly, the result follows from the fact that the
existence of more players than prizes implies that some player must earn an expected
payoﬀ of zero (at the lower bound of the union of the supports of the equilibrium
strategies and, hence, in equilibrium) and such a player is willing to compete away
any gains that other players might obtain by bidding strictly below one. This result
is an important starting point for the analysis of the two stage game, as it gives us
the unique equilibrium payoﬀs for all possible subgames in stage 2. We first consider
subgame perfect equilibria in which players are able to coordinate in stage 1 when
making their choices about which  ∈  they choose.
vary across the  prizes depending on the rank-order of the prize. In this environment, Barut and
Kovenock characterize the complete set of Nash equilibria and show that equilibrium payoﬀs are
unique although the set of equilibria could be quite large. The subgame employed in this paper is a
special case of the Barut-Kovenock game where all  prizes are identical and valued identically by
all players.
10
Note that Barut and Kovenock (1998) assume linear costs of eﬀort. However, reinterpreting ( )
as the "bid" generates the same results. The analysis could be extended to allow for nonlinearity
and heterogeneity as in Siegel (2009). However, this heterogeneity is tangential to our main research
question.
11
The all-pay auction without noise is sometimes seen as an extreme case. However, recent work
by Alcalde and Dahm (2010) suggests that there is a whole class of contest success functions with
(suﬃciently little) noise that have equilibria that are payoﬀ equivalent with those of the all-pay
auction without noise.
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Pure strategy choice of the prize set

We first consider and characterize the subgame perfect equilibria in which all players
make a deterministic choice of  ∈ . In such an equilibrium each player receives an

expected payoﬀ of either zero or one, depending on whether the boat chosen by the
player attracts more players than it has seats, or not. We first state the results12

Proposition 1 (i) If  ≥ , then all pure strategy equilibria yield a payoﬀ equal to
1 to each player. (ii) If   , then, for given  and , the pure strategy equilibria

with the highest total welfare have  =  for  − 1 boats and  =  − ( − 1) for

one boat. (iii) If a pure strategy equilibrium with the highest total welfare is chosen

for a given  ≡   , then the welfare is higher if there are more boats with fewer

seats. (iv) A pure strategy equilibrium exists in which all players have a zero payoﬀ
if and only if  ≥ ( + 1).
Proof. (i) For  ≥  quasi-partitions of players among the  boats with  ≤  for

all  = 1   exist. Let (1    ) be such a quasi-partition. In stage 2 each player
receives a payoﬀ of 1 given this quasi-partition. Suppose all but player  make their
choices in stage 1 according to this quasi-partition deterministically, and let  ∈ 

in the candidate equilibrium quasi-partition. If  chooses boat , ’s payoﬀ is equal to
1. If  chooses a diﬀerent boat  0 , then ’s payoﬀ is at most equal to 1. Moreover, we
need to rule out ineﬃcient pure strategy equilibria. Suppose there is a pure strategy
equilibrium with a lower payoﬀ. Then this implies that the quasi-partition in this
equilibrium has a set  with    and a set  with   . In this case the

deterministic choice of a player  in the set  yields a lower payoﬀ to  than if the
player chooses  ∈ . Hence, the quasi-partition with  and  is not an equilibrium
outcome with deterministic choices of boats.

(ii) For any quasi-partition (1    ), let ̂ be the set of boats  for which
 ≤  and ̂\ the set of boats for which   . Then the total welfare is equal to
P
∈̂  , as all players at boats with    receive zero payoﬀ and all other players

receive a payoﬀ of 1. The eﬃciency benchmark is a quasi-partition (1    ) with
12

In addition to the pure strategy equilibria and the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium there

is a large set of equilibria in which some players choose pure strategies and other players randomize.
There is also a large set of equilibria in which some or all players randomize over strict subsets of
the set of lifeboats.

8

1 = −1 =  and  =  − ( − 1). This benchmark is also an equilibrium.

Consider a player  who joined set  for  6= . This player has a payoﬀ equal to 1 in

the candidate equilibrium. If the player chooses any other set, his payoﬀ drops from 1
to zero, as the number of players in this set will then exceed the number . Similarly,
consider a player  who joined set  in the candidate equilibrium and has a payoﬀ of
0 there. If this player chooses any other  6= , the player’s payoﬀ is still zero. Hence,
staying at the boat that is overbooked is not worse than any of the alteratives.

(iii) For given  =   , the maximum welfare in (ii) as a function of  can
be written as ( − 1) =  − . This is a strictly decreasing function in .

(iv) We consider a quasi-partition (1    ) of players with  ≥  + 1 for all

 ∈ . The condition  ≥ ( + 1) is suﬃcient for such a quasi-partition to exist. We

show that this quasi-partition also emerges as a coordination equilibrium. Suppose
that all players choose their boat according to the quasi-partition. Consider now one
single player  who chooses boat  in the candidate equilibrium. This player receives
a payoﬀ of zero if he chooses . If he chooses any other boat  0 , the number of players

at that boat becomes  0 + 1  . Hence, ’s payoﬀ from all other choices is also zero.
Since  ≥ ( + 1) is also necessary for a quasi-partition of players with  ≥  + 1

for all  ∈  this condition is also necessary.

Intuitively, if the total number of seats is at least as great as the number of

players, there are functions that map the set of players to the set of seats that are
one-to-one (injective mappings); no player needs to compete with another player for
his seat, and each of these mappings is a subgame perfect equilibrium. Evidently, each
of these allocations is eﬃcient. Conversely, any mapping which is not injective, i.e.,
under which two or more players have to fight over seats, cannot be an equilibrium
if  ≡  ≥ , as players who face competition for their respective seat can simply

switch to another boat that has seats that would remain empty.

If, instead,  ≡    then as long as  ≥ 2, multiple payoﬀ nonequivalent

pure strategy equilibria exist, all having some set of players obtaining an equilibrium
payoﬀ of zero. The aggregate payoﬀ of a pure strategy equilibrium depends inversely
on the number of full boats to which the excess − of players over seats is allocated.
The number of players receiving a payoﬀ of one (and hence, the aggregate payoﬀ) is
maximized within the set of pure strategy equilibria in an equilibrium that coordinates
the strategies of players to place the excess  −  of players over seats into a single
9

boat, keeping all other boats at exact capacity 13 The number of players receiving a
payoﬀ of one is minimized within the set in an equilibrium that disperses each of the
excess  −  players to a diﬀerent full boat until all boats have at least  + 1 players

and then arbitrarily after that. In this case excess players are allocated in such a way
as to "spoil the pot" for the most boats.
Proposition 1 also implies that, if players can coordinate on the most eﬃcient
equilibrium in the lifeboat problem, then lifeboats should be as small as possible.14 All
but one lifeboat should be just filled, and all excess passengers should come together
at the one remaining lifeboat (and if the lifeboats were to be of heterogenous size,
all excess passengers should come together at the smallest lifeboat). The welfare loss
occurring due to the competition for seats is minimized in this case, and equal to
the benefit that would emerge from this last lifeboat in the absence of competition
for seats. Accordingly, if the total number of seats across all lifeboats is given and
the cost of provision of seats is independent of the composition on smaller or larger
boats, it is best to build the lifeboats as small as possible. One-person lifeboats (or
life vests) are optimal. Of course, coordination on the most eﬃcient equilibrium is
a heroic assumption in this context. In particular, if players coordinate on more
symmetric equilibria, they are more likely to end up in a situation in which there are
more than  players at each boat and their total payoﬀ is zero. This is the implication
of part () in the proposition.
It is interesting to consider the robustness of these equilibrium results for different contest success functions. If the rent per player is a strictly decreasing function
of the number of excess passengers - an assumption that is fulfilled for many types of
contest success functions - and if the number of passengers is  =  with  being an
13

Note also that if players were given an outside option which oﬀered a certain payoﬀ equal to

that received when not obtaining a seat ("going down with the ship") there exist asymmetric pure
strategy equilibria which are eﬃcient. In these equilibria any set of  −  players choose the outside

option with certainty and the  remaining players play pure strategies which generate an equal

allocation of players across the boats.
14
Here and in what follows we use the terms "coordinate" and "coordinated equilibrium" for
the type of subgame perfect equilibrium that is in pure strategies in stage 1 and characterized
in Proposition 1 and to distinguish them from the equilibria with mixing in stage 1 that will be
introduced later. Of course, for a choice of an equilibrium with mixing also some coordination in
the selection of equilibrium is necessary.
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integer, the symmetric equilibrium in which all boats are equally crowded, as in the
equilibrium characterized in (), is induced as a unique coordination equilibrium.
We show this in the appendix.
Of course, the coordination that underlies the pure strategy equilibria in
Proposition 1 is a strong assumption. We therefore view the symmetric but uncoordinated equilibria as more plausible outcomes and consider them next.

4

Mixed strategy choice of the prize set

We now consider subgame perfect equilibria in which players are unable to coordinate
on a pure strategy equilibrium and where they randomize independently and symmetrically in stage 1. The following proposition characterizes the equilibrium payoﬀs
as a function of   and  in this case.
Proposition 2 The payoﬀ of each player in the symmetric equilibrium without coordination is

¶
µ ¶
−1 µ
X
1 (−1)− 1
−1
(1 − )
 (  ) =




=0
∗

(1)

Proof. Consider the payoﬀs of players who arrive at a given boat. Let  be the
number of players arriving at boat  which has  seats. Recall from section 2: if
 ≤ , the players need not fight for a seat, hence, the payoﬀ for each of these

players is equal to the value of having a seat, which we normalized to  = 1. If

  , then the equilibrium payoﬀ of players in an all-pay auction is zero if the
number of (symmetric) players exceeds the number of (identical) prizes (Lemma 1).
Hence, players arriving at boats with suﬃcient supply have a payoﬀ of 1 and players
arriving at a boat with excess demand have a payoﬀ of zero.
Turn now to stage 1. Suppose that there is an equilibrium in which all players
2 3   randomize symmetrically and independently, i.e., each player goes to each
of the boats with the same probability. Then this probability is

1


for each player for

each boat. The probability that  of the other ( − 1) players show up at boat  as

well is

¶
µ
µ ¶
1 (−1)− 1
−1
(1 − )
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(2)

for  ≤  − 1, and this probability is the same for all boats. Accordingly, the

probability that no conflict takes place at boat  if player 1 goes to this boat is
¶
µ ¶
−1 µ
X
1 (−1)− 1
−1
(1 − )
(  ) =




=0

(3)

Symmetric randomization is optimal for player 1 given that all other players randomize symmetrically. This follows from the fact that the expected payoﬀ from going
to any of the  boats is exactly the same. Moreover, if all  players independently
randomize across all boats , then their expected payoﬀs are equal to this value.
Equation (3) shows how the payoﬀ in the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium depends on  and  for a given total capacity  = . We first consider the
extremes. Let  = 1 and  = . All players will approach the one and only lifeboat.
Hence, the aggregate payoﬀ from this is large and equal to  if and only if  ≤  = ,

but the aggregate payoﬀ will drop to zero for all    = . Compare this with the
other extreme case with lifeboats with the smallest possible capacity of  = 1, but a
number of lifeboats equal to  = , which generates the same total seating capacity.
In this case the expected payoﬀ to each player  from approaching a randomly chosen
boat  is equal to the probability that no other player approaches this boat, which
is equal to (1 − (1))−1 , and this is each player’s equilibrium payoﬀ in this case.

This payoﬀ is strictly smaller than 1 even if there are many more boats than there
are players, but it is also strictly positive when   , i.e., if there is an absolute
shortage of seats.
This discussion motivates the following characterization of the optimal composition ( ) for a given total number of seats  and players  in the uncoordinated
symmetric equilibrium.
Proposition 3 Consider the symmetric equilibrium in Proposition 2. Let    2.
(i) If  ≥ , then  =  and  = 1 maximizes the expected payoﬀ of all players.

If   , then  =  and  = 1 is dominated by all other combinations ( ) with
 = . (ii) If   , and  is even, then the optimum is an interior solution
( ≥ 2 and   ) if

µ

−1
−2

¶−2



 + 2 − 4
−1

For any given   1 there is a suﬃciently large  such that (4) is violated.
12

(4)

Proof. The first part of the proposition has already been established by the discussion
of the extreme cases  =  and  = . The second part of the proposition can be
established by comparing payoﬀs for ( = 1;  = ) and ( = 2;  = (2)). We
already derived the payoﬀ for  = 1 as (1 − (1))−1 = (1 − (1))−1 . To derive the
payoﬀ for  = 2 and  = 2, note that the probability that no other player arrives

at boat  is (1 − (1))−1 = (1 − (2))−1 . Moreover, the probability that just

one other player arrives at boat  is equal to ( − 1)(1 − (2))−2 (2). Hence, a

player’s equilibrium payoﬀ for ( = 1;  = ) is lower than for ( = 2;  = (2)) if
(1 − (1))−1  (1 − (2))−1 + ( − 1)(1 − (2))−2 (2)

(5)

The condition (5) can be transformed into (4).
The first result in Proposition 3 suggests that, if there is no absolute shortage
of boat seats, eﬃciency can be achieved by having only one boat — as this essentially
solves the coordination problem. If there is an absolute shortage of seats the lack
of coordination has two eﬀects. On the one hand it may cause a welfare loss due
to ineﬃcient use of capacity: with some probability some boats have strictly fewer
passengers than seats. On the other hand, passengers in boats which do not have
more passengers than seats enjoy a positive rent. If there are more but smaller boats,
this changes the relative importance of these two eﬀects.
The comparative static properties of this equilibrium are numerically straightforward. For instance, the additional payoﬀ derived from an additional boat of given
boat-size  is ∗ (  + 1 ) − ∗ (  ), and using (1) it can be written explicitly as
¶"
¶
µ
µ ¶ #
−1 µ
X
1 (−1)−
−1
1
1 (−1)− 1
(1 −

(6)
)
− (1 − )


+
1

+
1


=0
Similarly, the additional payoﬀ derived from an additional seat in each of the boats
is  ∗ (   + 1) −  ∗ (  ), and using (1) it can be written explicitly as
¶
µ ¶
µ
1 (−1)− 1
−1
(1 − )
.




(7)

We can also look at the trade-oﬀ between many small boats versus few large boats
for a given overall capacity . The two extreme cases are ( ) = ( 1) and ( ) =
(2 (2)). Let the number of passengers be  times the total number of seats:  = ,
with  ≥ 2. Consider first ( ) = ( 1). The probability that a player is the only
13

player arriving at a given boat in the symmetric equilibrium is (1 − (1))−1 . As
 increases

lim (1 − (1))−1 = −  0.

→∞

(8)

Hence, even if the number of passengers vastly exceeds the number of seats, as long as
the ratio of passengers to seats remains fixed, the probability that a single passenger
arrives at an empty seat is quite substantial. In contrast, if there are only two boats
with joint capacity of  and the number of passengers is  times as large as the total
number of seats, as  increases without bound the probability that one of the boats
is approached by less than 2 passengers is driven down to zero.15
Table 1 provides further insight into the comparative static properties of the
equilibrium payoﬀ. It shows the equilibrium payoﬀ to a representative player in the
symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium for diﬀerent values of  and  and for  = 100.
Each cell in the table provides the payoﬀ in the case where the number of seats per
boat is given by the corresponding row value of  and the total number of seats 
is given by the corresponding column value The number of lifeboats can be easily
derived by dividing the corresponding value of  given by the column by the value
of  appearing in the row. Blank cells correspond to parameter values for which 
or  is not an integer, so that this number cannot be obtained by utilizing equally
sized lifeboats with  seats each. As can be easily seen, for values of  greater than
 = 100, payoﬀs are monotonically increasing in the number of seats per boat until
a point is reached where the number of seats per boat equals the number of players.
The table also illustrates the large welfare losses that may be realized when players
choose their boat due to the "coordination failure" arising from the randomization
generated by the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium. Even if there are double the
number of seats as players ( = 200 and  = 100), if these seats are configured in 200
one-seat boats, the welfare is only approximately 60% of that arising in with a single
boat of 200 seats (or two boats with 100 seats). If there are exactly 100 seats the
welfare with 100 single-seat boats is approximately 37% of that with a single 100-seat
15

The probability that a given boat is approached by no more than 2 passengers is equal

to the cumulative distribution function of the binomial distribution with parameters  and 12,
evaluated at 2. Using normal approximation to the binomial cumulative distribution with a
12
+ ()−(12) ) which (since
continuity correction this probability may be written as Φ((1 − )( 
 )

1 −   0) approaches 0 as  → ∞.
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boat. Moreover, even with five twenty-seat boats, this welfare rises only to about
48% of the optimal welfare.


60

80

90

96

1

189

288

331

355

370 437 609

2

.154

289

351

386

409 507 739

3

122

355

399

4

097

−

265

405

437 579 863

5

077

252

−

351

445 604 897

6

061

347

410

8

215

023

193

−

411

10

−

−

−

328

12

014
000

109

−

409

20

−

100

−

−

−

−



−

100

−

−

120

549

625

200

−

−

−

660 955

−

715

1

−

−

464 689 973

−

480 794 998

−
1

Table 1: Payoﬀs to a representative player for  = 100
Blank spaces indicate cases where  is not perfectly
divisible by 
When the total number of seats is strictly lower than the number of players,
there is in a sense an optimal amount of coordination failure that may or may not
lead to interior configurations of seats per boat. When  is small relative to 
a player can only expect to obtain a positive payoﬀ if the players are suﬃciently
unequally spread across boats and a player is lucky enough to find himself in a boat
that receives a small number of people. In this case the coordination failure resulting
from randomization is valuable and the optimal configuration of seats is  =  and
 = 1. This is indicated in Table 1 in the case where  = 60 where the bold entry
corresponding to  = 1 shows a maximum expected payoﬀ of 189 For  = 60
payoﬀs are decreasing as the number of seats per boat increases. Starting at a value
of  slightly below eighty, the welfare maximizing amount of coordination failure
decreases suﬃciently to generate an interior solution. For  = 80 the payoﬀ from
setting  = 2 and  = 40 slightly improves upon  = 1 and  = 80 and this becomes
15

the optimal configuration, yielding a payoﬀ of 289. Payoﬀs decrease in  beyond
 = 2 in this case. For  = 90 the optimal configuration is  = 3 and  = 30 with
payoﬀs increasing in  for lower values of  and decreasing in  for higher values
of  Finally, when the number of players exceeds the number of seats by a number
that is very small relative to the number of players ( = 100  = 96) too much
coordination failure leads to wasted capacity and the optimal number of seats per
boat rises to  = 8 corresponding to  = 12 In this case, despite the fairly small
shortfall in seats, welfare is 411, less than half of the optimum with one seat per
passenger ( = 100  = 100) but substantially higher than that which would arise
at either extreme when  = 96: when  = 1and  = 96 welfare is 355 and when
 = 1 and  = 96 welfare is zero.
Note that there are also other asymmetric equilibria, some involving deterministic and mixed strategies. For    we illustrate this by characterizing three
more intermediate types of equilibrium. First, one interesting type of equilibrium has
a partition with  −  boats being just filled to their capacity , and the remaining

 ≥ 2 boats attracting all remaining  − ( − ) players with equal probability.16

For  = 1 this degenenerates to the eﬃcient coordination equilibrium in part ()
of Proposition 1, and for  = , this yields the symmetric equilibrium with mixing

as in Proposition 2. As can be shown, for this set of equilibria, the average payoﬀ
of players decreases in . However, as has been argued in the context of coordination equilibria, the existence of equilibria for    is sensitive to the choice of the
contest success function. For a contest success function that induces a payoﬀ that
is strictly decreasing in the number of excess passengers that arrive at a given boat,
these asymmetric outcomes are not robust. Second, there can also be equilibria in
which the players who randomize do not randomize symmetrically across all boats.
For example, let there be  players and  boats with capacity , and let  and  be
even. Then there is an equilibrium in which 2 of the players randomize symmetrically across the boats 1 to 2, and the other half of the players randomize across
16

To see that this is an equilibrium, note that all players employing a deterministic strategy have

the highest possible payoﬀ of 1, whereas players who randomize between the  remaining boats
have a payoﬀ equal to ∗ ( − ( − )  )  0 at any of the  remaining boats, and a payoﬀ of

zero if they deviate and choose one of the  −  boats that are exactly filled.
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the second half of the boats. Their equilibrium payoﬀs are  ∗ (2 2 ).17 Third,
for  ≥ 2 there is a set of equilibria in which  players each choose deterministically

one boat in a way such that every boat has    of these players, and all other
players randomize symmetrically among the  boats. The probability that no more
than  players show up at a boat  in this case is equal to the probability that  − 
or less of the ( − ) randomizing players show up at this boat. For this group of

( − ) randomizing players, the problem is equivalent to the lifeboat problem with

this number of players and  boats with capacity  − . Accordingly, the equilibrium

payoﬀ is  ∗ (( − )  ( − )), and this is also the payoﬀ for each of the players who
deterministically choose this boat.

As the welfare in the equilibrium with pure strategy boat-selection choices in
stage 1 generates full eﬃciency for  ≤ , but not for the symmetric equilibrium with
randomization, the coordinated equilibrium is superior to the fully uncoordinated

symmetric equilibrium for  ≤ . The comparison is much less clear for   , as

there is a wide variety of equilibria in both deterministic and stochastic boat-selection
choices as well as hybrid equilibria. In particular, coordinated equilibria need not
yield higher total welfare than uncoordinated equilibria, as any of the uncoordinated
equilibria we have considered has higher expected payoﬀs for the players than the
symmetric fully coordinated equilibrium of type (). Moreover, even a type ()
coordinated equilibrium that yields highest total welfare yields an expected payoﬀ of
zero to a non-empty subset of players. Since these players earn a positive expected
payoﬀ in uncoordinated equilibria, no coordination equilibrium Pareto dominates any
of the uncoordinated equilibria if there are more passengers than seats.

5

Conclusions

Players often have to choose which contest to enter, not knowing the decisions of
other players. As a result, some players may find themselves in a situation with many
players competing for few prizes, in which competition is strong, or alternatively they
may end up in an environment with few other competitors compared to the number
of prizes. In this article we highlight the role of the partitioning of prizes into diﬀerent
17

A proof follows the lines of proof in Proposition 2 for each of the two subgroups and from the

observation that none of the players can gain from switching to the other subset of boats.
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sets and the importance of the process by which players choose the set of prizes over
which they compete. We characterize the set of pure strategy equilibria and the
symmetric equilibrium that is typically in mixed strategies. We find that when total
capacity is too small to accommodate all users, a partition of that capacity into smaller
subsets ("boats") can increase welfare if individuals must simultaneously select a set of
prizes ("seats") over which they compete. This result holds for both types of equilibria
that we consider: both coordinated equilibria in pure strategies and the symmetric
mixed strategy equilibrium have higher welfare with the partition of prizes. This
result uncovers a general principle which may apply universally to a large number
of problems that range from education choices among diﬀerent, mutually exclusive
alternatives to choices of territory among animals. Here we focus on a particular type
of interaction in case capacity falls short of demand: an all-pay contest without noise.
Other allocation mechanisms in which players discontinuously suﬀer if the number
of players arriving at a "boat" exceeds the number of "seats" are likely to generate
similar results.

6

Appendix

In this appendix we consider a situation with
( + ) =  for some  ∈ 

(9)

and characterize the set of equilibria with any contest success function in the subgame
in stage 2 for which the expected equilibrium payoﬀ per player in the contest with 
players and  identical prizes is strictly decreasing in  for  ≥  and constant in 
for  ≤  where  and  are natural numbers. We show:

Proposition 4 For any equilibrium in pure strategies the number of passengers at
each boat  is equal to  =  + .
Proof. Consider any partition of players 1    yielding an expected payoﬀ to each
player who has chosen boat  of ( ). Condition (9) implies that either 1 = 2 =
 =  , or there are at least two boats  and  with    + 1 and  ≥  + 2. In
turn, this implies that the partition cannot be an equilibrium, as each player in boat
 could increase his expected payoﬀ from ( ) to ( + 1) by defecting to boat .
18
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